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The Changing Face of El Moudjahid During the Algerian War of 
Independence 
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The 1956 Soummam conference is considered a turning point for Algeria’s National 
Liberation Front (FLN), due to a platform that asserted the supremacy of political over military 
objectives and the corollary importance of diplomacy and public relations. For domestic 
outreach, the FLN turned to a small publication that had debuted months previously - El 
Moudjahid - giving it a heightened profile and a new importance. 
From its founding in June 1956 to the Evian Accords in March 1962, El Moudjahid’s 
layout evolved dramatically – an evolution most evident on its cover page. The simple style and 
pamphlet-like shape of the early issues initially shifted to a text-dense “broadsheet” layout, and 
ultimately by a single photograph. Yet even after the layout stabilized, the page’s various 
elements continued to evolve. This article argues that these changes illustrate Hayden White’s 
argument about the “content of the form”: that the physical organization of a page is not inert, 
but rather influences how readers understand its content. Taking this seriously means turning the 
analysis from El Moudjahid’s content to its physical structure: its cover page elements and their 
relationship with the text. 
Focusing on El Moudjahid’s French edition, this study addresses ten elements: the 
language used, the presence, size, and placement of the title, authorship, the presence, size, and 
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placement of the crescent and star emblem, the subtitle “Organe Central du Front de Libération 
Nationale”, inset articles and notices, the presence and location of the place of publication, the 
amount and currency of the price, the slogan “Révolution Par le Peuple et Pour le Peuple”, and 
the presence of the Algerian flag. It concludes by examining two time elements: the publication 
date and the issue number. Complicating Benedict Anderson’s arguments about the linear nature 
of  “national time”, El Moudjahid presented Algeria’s national time as both horizontal and 
vertical – linear and sacral. Its publication date and issue number anchored the reader in 
horizontal calendar time. However, as an “organ” El Moudjahid differed from Anderson’s 
national newspaper. It added verticality by emphasizing the sacrality of anniversaries, like that of 
November 1, 1954.  
While scholars have used El Moudjahid as a primary-source archive, they have put little 
analytic pressure on the cover and other constituent parts. Doing so enables a more substantive 
understanding of the journal, its operations, and its impact, in ways that can only enrich its 
archival uses in the future. 
 
Text 
The first six months of 1956 were a dark time for the FLN. Little more than one year after the 
All Saints’ Day attack with which the fledgling front launched its offensive against the colonial 
French government, its organization seemed dissolute and chaotic; its operations were at a 
standstill. Several members of the original leadership had been killed during guerrilla skirmishes 
or French counter-attacks. Meanwhile, several recruits had emerged as de facto leaders despite 
their lack of clearly defined positions within the FLN command. Personality and ideological 
clashes, as well as disagreements over whose voice should represent the FLN, added tension to 
this confusion of absent and new faces. Moreover, the dispersion of FLN leadership throughout 
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Algeria as well as outside cities (primarily Cairo) hindered effective communication and led to 
divergences in strategic and tactical objectives. Domestically, the communication difficulties had 
led to the increasing autonomy of the FLN’s six military zones: they developed differing 
strategic approaches that enjoyed widely varying degrees of success. Overall, military successes 
were haphazard and seemed insufficient to either mobilize Algerians to rally behind the FLN or 
provoke the French into abandoning the country.  
Despite their differences, FLN leaders recognized the danger that these factors posed to 
the revolution’s eventual success. The deleterious effects that internal disagreements and an 
indeterminate hierarchy of command were having on the FLN’s military campaign were evident. 
Additionally, some of the leadership had become convinced that it would be the FLN’s political 
campaign – and not its guerrilla exploits – on which the chance of victory depended. The 
development of such a campaign had until this point been effectively sidelined by the 
predominance of military concerns. Now, the FLN needed to establish a clear organizational 
hierarchy, a concrete political focus, and an organized system for diplomatic initiatives abroad 
and propaganda at home. Interior leaders, guided by Abane Ramdane, proposed a major 
conference involving current leadership as well as representatives from each of the wilaya 
commands. 
Having convinced the remaining FLN leadership of the need for such a conference, 
determining its location became a critical issue. Holding the conference inside Algeria entailed a 
higher risk for the FLN as a whole: were the French to learn of the conference, they would enjoy 
an unparalleled opportunity to effectively decapitate the FLN. Yet successfully staging the 
conference in Algeria would represent a substantial public relations coup. It would suggest to the 
Algerian people, as much as to the outside world, that French control of the territory was more 
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tentative than had been assumed. This symbolic value – coupled with lukewarm support from the 
Egyptian government in Cairo, seen as the most logical exterior option – led to the decision to 
hold the conference at Soummam.  
Soummam and the focus on the political 
To safeguard participants, Soummam’s zonal chief organized raids outside the town, 
diverting French attention from Soummam itself while allaying the suspicions that a period of 
quiet might otherwise arouse. Meanwhile, Ahmad Ben Bella and other representatives of the 
exterior leadership travelled to Marseilles to await an “all-clear” signal before attempting to 
smuggle themselves into Algeria. They waited in vain: the Soummam Conference convened 
August 20 without them, its proceedings guided by Ramdane; whether this represented a 
deliberate policy of exclusion or the unfortunate unfolding of circumstances has been debated. 
What is less debated is that Ramdane and his supporters capitalized upon the exterior 
leadership’s absence to work for the efficient ratification of the platform that he supported.ii   
Both FLN leaders and outside observers soon described the platform established at 
Soummam as a turning point, introducing a new stage for the FLN’s development as an 
organization. One of its most noted components included an assertion of the supremacy of 
political over military objectives. This reflected the political leadership’s concerns that ALN 
officers were arrogating too much authority and prioritizing military operations over diplomatic 
efforts. Two new institutions – an executive committee and a governing authority empowered to 
negotiate and making binding commitments for the FLN – were created, in which the military 
leadership was given a subordinate role. (Over time, this supremacy was challenged by the 
greater sophistication of ALN institutions relative to those of the FLN, as well as former military 
leader Belkacem Krim’s domination of the political leadership.iii)  
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In keeping with Soummam’s focus on the political, another plank emphasized the 
importance of diplomatic efforts and domestic propaganda. Ramdane believed that the FLN 
could only win by mobilizing international public opinion. Consequently, the FLN put renewed 
stress on “internationalizing” the conflict via diplomatic efforts to engage the United Nations, the 
Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity.  Ramdane similarly believed that success 
depended on the FLN becoming a national movement enjoying the active support of the Algerian 
people. The FLN’s previous public relations efforts had been largely limited to distributing 
leaflets and bulletins. After Soummam, propagandizing became a top priority. The FLN’s 
primary vehicle for this was a small publication that had debuted two months earlier: El 
Moudjahid.  
 
El Moudjahid post-Soummam 
Soummam’s emphasis on the need for domestic propaganda brought El Moudjahid under 
the direct control of FLN leadership, giving it a heightened profile and the means to continue as a 
regular publication. Published in both Arabic and French, the first seven issues were distributed 
as monthlies, running from June 1956 until January 1957. They were printed secretly in Algiers, 
at first on a primitive mimeograph-style machine known as a roneograph, but subsequently on a 
printing press. However, the press was destroyed during the Battle of Algiers – a bloody and 
bitter defeat for the FLN –, and various editorial staff were tortured or killed by French 
paramilitary troops; the seventh issue was never published. Several months passed before the 
surviving staff began publishing El Moudjahid again, distributing three issues from Tetouan in 
August and September 1957. A second, shorter publishing hiatus followed before the paper 
resumed publication from Tunis in November. This move was decisive and lasting: El 
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Moudjahid would continue to be printed in Tunis until the end of the war, with copies smuggled 
into Algeria and shipped abroad.  
The changes in El Moudjahid’s physical location were more than matched by shifts in its 
appearance. From 1956 to 1962, the El Moudjahid’s layout evolved dramatically in structure and 
design – an evolution most evident on its cover page, which went through several iterations 
before settling on a fairly stable layout foundation by late 1958. The simple, graphic style and 
pamphlet-like shape of the first five issues was initially replaced by a text-dense “broadsheet” 
layout in which the cover page appeared more like the front page of a newspaper, which lasted 
through Issue 15. From Issue 16 through Issue 31, this layout gradually evolved into one that 
combined large photographs with a bold headline. Photos almost entirely dominated the cover 
page from Issue 32 (11/20/58) through Issue 91 (3/19/62) and the end of the war. Yet even when 
the overall layout stabilized, the various information elements continued to evolve. What can be 
gleaned from these elements and their evolution? 
These changes could be attributed to the exigencies of publishing during wartime: The 
material conditions of production were frequently uncertain and less than ideal. Moreover, few 
FLN leaders had previous experience in producing propaganda: Shifts in layout could be 
ascribed to the inconsistency and experimentation of a changing group of amateurs. Yet if taken 
seriously, these shifts illustrate what Hayden White (1987) terms the important “content of the 
form” of written works. White argues that the form – the physical organization of newspaper 
columns or a book’s page – is not inert, but rather influences what the reader takes from the 
content. Taking this seriously means turning the analysis back from the content and rhetoric of El 
Moudjahid’s articles and towards their physical structure, giving the cover page and its layout 
greater significance. Examining cover page elements as well as the shifting relationship between 
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the page and its text offers deeper analytic insights about El Moudjahid as a propaganda project, 
both with respect to its primary Algerian audience and a broader international one. 
El Moudjahid’s changing face 
The issues analyzed here are those of the war years and the French-language edition – 
numbers 1-91. They cover the period from El Moudjahid’s founding in June 1956 until March 
19, 1962, when the Evian Accords were signed. Examining these wartime issues reveals a 
number of cover page elements, some of which remained constant, but many of which evolved 
or appeared and disappeared over time. This study focuses on nine key elements: 
1) Language (Arabic/French)  
2) Title - “El Moudjahid” (presence/size/placement) 
3) Authorship (individual/collective/significance) 
4) Emblem - crescent and star (presence/size/placement) 
5) Subtitle - “Organe Central du Front de Libération Nationale” (presence/size/placement) 
6) Insets – articles and notices presented in boxes 
7) Place of publication (presence/location) 
8) Price (presence/amount/currency) 
9) Slogan - “Révolution Par le Peuple et Pour le Peuple” and flag (presence/significance) 
 
It concludes with an examination of two elements that work in tandem with the headlines to 
indicate the war’s progress over time: the presence of a publication date and the calendar used 
for this, and the presence of an issue number. Together, these indicated the FLN’s commitment 
to independence and the paper’s commitment to a narrative of inevitable, if long-fought, victory. 
The copies used for this research are taken from three bound volumes printed in Belgrade 
shortly after independence.iv These volumes include facsimiles of each issue’s cover page 
followed by its full text, retyped in column form. Working from their office in Tunis, El 
Moudjahid’s editors themselves oversaw publication of these volumes, which were published in 
June, July, and August 1962. Yugoslavia, which supported the FLN throughout the war, helped 
underwrite the costs of production: in the preface to the first volume, the editors thanked 
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Yugoslavia’s “Secretariat of Information” for providing financial and technical support.v (These 
volumes include only the French-language issues; there appears to have been no similar 
republication of the Arabic-language issues.) 
Analyzing El Moudjahid 
1) Language 
As noted above, El Moudjahid appeared from its inception in two editions – Arabic and 
French, with both printed on the same roneograph machine. The decision to publish in these two 
languages reflected several inter-related issues: the complex linguistic situation in Algeria after 
more than 125 years of French colonization, earlier decisions made regarding the FLN’s working 
language, and the multiple targets of FLN propaganda efforts (El Moudjahid 1962, Vol. I, p. 3). 
French and Arabic might be described as charged languages, putting pressure on speaker (or 
writer) and audience alike thanks to the differing positions they occupied in the colonial 
hierarchy. 
Benedict Anderson has described the position of colonial languages – like French in 
colonial Algeria – as “imperial languages” that intervene in the imagining of the national 
community. Whether the post-colonial state accepts them or rejects, them, imperial languages 
collaborate in constructing the national community even if merely by establishing a contrast with 
the local language(s). For Anderson, imperial languages highlight the active role that languages 
play in producing – rather than merely reflecting – the nation. He argues that 
[i]t is always a mistake to treat languages in the way that certain nationalist ideologues 
treat them – as emblems of nation-ness, like flags, costumes, folk-dances, and the rest. 
Much the most important thing about language is its capacity for generating imagined 
communities, building in effect particular solidarities. After all, imperial languages are 
still vernaculars (1991, p. 133-4). 
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French might have become an Algerian vernacular, but one altered by the socio-political context. 
Algerians could not claim French as their “personal property” (Anderson, p. 84) in the same 
manner as French citizens (regardless of their regional mother tongue). Nor could it bind the 
national community in the same way – not least because access to French had served as a means 
to divide Algerians.  
In contrast to Benedict Anderson’s assertion in his now-classic work on nationalism that 
language is “fundamentally inclusive, limited only by the fatality of Babel: no one lives long 
enough to learn all languages” (1991, p. 134), controlling language access was an essential 
weapon in the French colonial arsenal. The repercussions of this indirectly affected not only the 
choice to publish El Moudjahid in French, but also the FLN’s decision to use French as its 
primary working language. Many FLN leaders were ethnically Berber (Imazighen); historically, 
French policy had prevented them from enrolling in Arabic-language schools.vi This policy 
developed from a nineteenth-century French belief that Berbers were the inheritors of a Western 
Roman tradition, who had suffered from the forcible imposition of Arab culture and language (as 
well as Islam).vii As a result, colonial administrators assumed that Berbers would be more easily 
assimilated into French culture and citizenship, and possibly more amenable to Christian 
evangelizing. Although these beliefs eroded over time – particularly those related to conversion –
, the colonial state continued to treat Arab and Berber as discrete communities, privileging the 
latter and channelling them educationally away from Arabic and toward French.viii 
Even French-educated Berber Algerians still spoke their mother tongues at home, 
however – meaning that there were several contenders for an Algerian national language. From 
the FLN’s perspective, French offered the practical advantage of being understood by all FLN 
leaders, and the ideological advantage of presenting no viable threat to the claims of Arabic or 
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the Berber languages. As a result, French became the organization’s lingua franca. As Jacques 
Duchemin noted: “All orders and all administrative materials were written in French or 
bilingually”. He described French as the language most commonly spoken throughout the ALN, 
with Arabic and the Berber languages employed like regional vernaculars in France. “Arabic and 
Kabyle were spoken somewhat, but not more than Breton, Alsatian or Provencal in French 
barracks” (1962, p. 129-30).ix  
If the use of French as a publishing language reflected both the overall linguistic picture 
of Algeria and the specific administrative decisions of the FLN, it also permitted El Moudjahid 
to reach a broader audience internationally. Publishing in French allowed the FLN to make its 
case to the French public and others beyond the Arab world. Perhaps most importantly, French 
was an official United Nations language, and internationalizing the Algerian cause through 
appeals to the United Nations became a crucial aspect of FLN strategy.x Although El 
Moudjahid’s articles and editorials were almost always addressed to Algerians, publishing in 
French broadened the FLN’s potential audience base to include key international constituencies. 
Perhaps reflecting this broadening, each edition had its own writing and editorial staff, although 
housed in the same building.xi In other words, while there was some overlap between the 
editions, neither the French nor the Arabic existed merely as a translation of the other.xii 
2) Title 
El Moudjahid was a bold title. The word is Arabic; the transcription is French. Coming 
from the same root as the word “jihad” (as well as “ijtihad”), it likely resonated with French 
officials as well as Algerians. The concept of jihad as religiously inflected resistance to colonial 
authorities had been invoked since the French invasion in 1830, perhaps most notably with Abd 
al-Qadir in the 1830s and 1840s and various mahdist movements in subsequent decades. The 
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FLN’s use of  “el moudjahid” must be seen against the array of other possible choices, including 
more neutral Arabic terms such as “the soldier”, “the revolutionary” or “the volunteer”, as well 
as any array of equivalent French terms. Titling both editions by the same Arabic term unified 
them; titling them “El Moudjahid” lent them a particularly Islamic character, while also linking 
the paper and the FLN to earlier manifestations of Algerian resistance.  
The same resonance that made “el moudjahid” a powerful term also made it potentially 
difficult to control. The paper’s efforts to control the term included defining and contextualizing 
it - starting with the editorial that accompanied the first issue in June 1956. The editorial 
acknowledged “el moudjahid’s” religious overtones by translating it into French as “fighter for 
the faith”. But it separated the Algerian struggle for independence, however religiously inflected, 
from Western stereotyping of Islam as the “religion of the sword”, xiii arguing that 
The word “jihad” (holy war), from which “el moudjahid” (fighter for the faith) 
derives, has always been, due to an anti-Islamic prejudice dating from the Crusades, 
taken in the Christian West in a narrow and restrictive sense. It appears as a symbol 
of religious aggressivity. 
 
Yet, the editorial argued, this view is false: 
 
This interpretation is already rendered absurd by the very fact that Islam is tolerant; 
and that respect for religions, and in particular Christianity and Judaism, is one of its 
fundamental prescriptions, and one put in practice for centuries. 
 
Instead, “jihad” was “simply an energetic demonstration [manifestation dynamique] of self-
defence”, one aimed at protecting or restoring “a patrimony of higher values indispensable to the 
individual and the community.” Rather than a call to violence, jihad was a call to self-
improvement: it embraced “the desire to perfect oneself [se parfaire] continually in all areas.” 
Since religious resistance had been the idiom of Algerian resistance to French occupation since 
1830, it was the most appropriate to the struggle for independence. “Islam in Algeria was the 
final refuge of values [that had been] hunted down and profaned by an extreme colonialism,” the 
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editorial stated. “Is it surprising that, in the moment of recovering a national conscience, [Islam] 
arrives to contribute to the triumph of a just cause?” (El Moudjahid 1962, V. I, p. 8-9)  
Despite the religious invocations of this first editorial, elements on several issues’ cover 
pages balanced the religious connotations of “el moudjahid” with less religious ones. The first 
three issues included “Le Combattant” as a subtitle, translating “El Moudjahid” for French 
speakers with a term that made no reference to religion or faith. Nor did outside observers see the 
term as intrinsically Islamic. For example, the New York Times, which began citing El 
Moudjahid as a source in July 1958, translated the title for its American audience as “The 
Fighter” and made no reference to the term’s religious heritage.xiv Even the editorial itself might 
be said to hedge slightly, arguing later that the FLN merely adopted a term already in popular 
use: “In calling itself El Moudjahid, this paper does nothing but consecrate the glorious name 
that our people’s good sense has, since November 1, 1954, attributed to the patriots who have 
taken arms for a free Algeria.” (El Moudjahid 1962, V. I, p. 9) 
 Regardless of intent, the religious identity invoked through even a secular use of “el 
moudjahid” was one that excluded as much as it included Algerians as participants in the 
national struggle. If Islam were the idiom through which Algerians historically resisted French 
colonialism, and through which they would now seek independence, then what role could non-
Muslims - Jewish Algerians, colons, and the small group of “évolués” - play? Although the 
FLN’s embrace of Islam and a Muslim political identity waxed and waned during the war years, 




The corporate approach to authorship suggested by the unsigned editorial analyzed above 
was characteristic of El Moudjahid. Named authors played little role on the cover page or in the 
paper as a whole: El Moudjahid’s articles and editorials were almost always published without 
attribution, and nor were editorial staff identified by name. In place of individual authors, many 
editorials were signed “El Moudjahid” or “la direction d’El Moudjahid” – reaffirming the 
collective approach while highlighting the paper’s title. 
The absence of identified authors and editors limited readers’ ability to link particular 
articles with an individual’s political position or writing style. This authorial anonymity fit with 
the FLN’s principle of “collective leadership”; it also limited French authorities’ capacity to use 
El Moudjahid articles against any FLN member taken into French custody. However, the lack of 
attribution also raises the question of how closely top FLN leadership were involved in the 
journal, and to what extent the paper’s views mirrored, deviated from, or pushed those of the 
GPRA. 
During the FLN’s initial turn toward propaganda, top leadership seems to have been 
directly involved in the paper. Issue Three, published in September 1956 – one month after 
Soummam –, was the only one to name the author of every article. Many were central FLN 
figures: Ramdane wrote the editorial and Belkacem Krim and Mohammed Larbi Ben M’Hidi 
each contributed articles. As Mameri (1988) suggests, the FLN leadership seems clearly to have 
at this point been directly involved in boosting El Moudjahid’s profile, giving credence to its 
claim to be the “central organ of the FLN”.xv While no other issue included so many authored 
pieces, the paper did attach names to certain kinds of articles, including letters of support sent by 
heads of various national governments, appeals from GPRA President Ferhat Abbas, and 
conference reports from Frantz Fanon. Authored articles also included numerous “day in the life” 
 14 
pieces by ALN soldiers and officers, including “Notre armée et sa stratégie”, written by a 
Colonel Saadek of Wilaya IV. (El Moudjahid 1962, V. I, p. 100) Similarly, reprints of letters sent 
from soldiers to family and friends included the senders’ first names.  
4) Emblem 
Several graphic and textual elements contributed to the title’s appearance on El 
Moudjahid’s cover page – reinforcing its connection to Islam and the FLN. The Islamic crescent 
and star emblem appears as a prominent graphic element on all but one of the first thirty issues, 
with its size and placement varying considerably on the first nine.xvi In the first issue, the hand-
sketched emblem emerged from under the hand-drawn title, which cut an upward diagonal swath 
across the page. Issues 2 and 3 showed the emblem and title superimposed upon the Algerian 
national flag (discussed below). Perhaps the most striking cover was that of Issue 9 (8/20/57), 
which superimposed text over a hand-drawn crescent and star that covered over two-thirds of the 
page. Two much smaller crescent and star emblems flanked what might be described as the 
paper’s subtitle - “Organe Central du Front de Libération Nationale Algérienne” -, an element 
introduced in Issue Eight (8/5/57). The subtitle and small emblems were enclosed in a 
rectangular box directly under El Moudjahid’s title, and appeared in this format for the next 
twenty-two issues. 
FLN correspondence of this period also employed the crescent and star emblem. For 
example, a FLN “tract” from 1957 incorporated a hand-drawn crescent and star into the 
document’s header - like a logo on corporate letterhead (Duchemin 1962). Yet after Issue 31 
(11/1/58), the crescent and star emblem disappeared from El Moudjahid’s cover page. This 
disappearance seems curious since the FLN’s commitment to Islamic socialism is generally seen 
to have solidified during this period – one of military ascendancy following secularist Abane 
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Ramdane’s assassination. With El Moudjahid’s Arabic title and embrace of Islam as the historic 
idiom of Algerian resistance, retaining the crescent and star emblem would have made sense. 
However, Issue 31 also marked the war’s four-year anniversary - its headline read: “la revolution 
à quatre ans”. Several elements changed in Issue 32 or shortly thereafter. Removing the graphic 
element that visually signalled an Islamic identity could have been a sign of the FLN’s maturing 
political program, its preparation for outreach to a broader, not-necessarily Muslim audience, 
and/or a general re-evaluation of the paper’s cover page. 
5) Subtitle 
While the crescent and star disappeared from the cover page in November 1958, the 
phrase “Organe Central du Front de Libération National” remained. Announcing El Moudjahid’s 
connection with the FLN, it appeared on the cover page of every issue published during the war. 
Like several cover elements, it shifted positions considerably during the first seven issues before 
settling into a “subtitle” position with Issue Eight (8/5/57). After Issue 30, it moved into the top 
right-hand corner; the issue date, number, and price appeared directly beneath it.xvii The changes 
in position seem less crucial than the fact of its consistent presence, which reaffirmed El 
Moudjahid’s claim to legitimacy as the sole voice of the FLN, authorized to publicly broadcast 
its views and to proselytize on its behalf. Although visually a subtitle, this phrase might be more 
aptly considered part of the journal’s branding. 
6) Insets 
As argued above, Issue Eight, which resurrected the journal after seven months of 
silence, marked a key moment in El Moudjahid’s development. It was not only the first issue 
published after the Battle of Algiers, but also the first issue published outside Algeria. Perhaps 
reflecting the capabilities of a new printing press, the layout changed. El Moudjahid adopted a 
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newspaper-like front page, with articles arranged in columns and covering much of the page, and 
the title and subtitle reduced to a “header” at the page’s top right edge. This layout, retained 
through Issue 15, often included a small photo associated with one of the articles. Perhaps most 
noticeably, editorials and special notices were now from ordinary text by a rectangular outline 
inset, highlighting their importance. 
These inset pieces often featured FLN memoranda and communiqués, including ones 
referring specifically to El Moudjahid. The first inset piece, which also appeared in Issue Eight 
might have been the most crucial: it featured a statement issued by the CCE that confirmed El 
Moudjahid’s “official” status, stating that its purpose was to advance the struggle by reporting on 
and explaining events to the Algerian population. By supporting the FLN’s “political, social, and 
cultural program” in its articles, El Moudjahid was to strengthen the nation’s unity and resolve 
(El Moudjahid 1962, V. I, p. 84). This communiqué reaffirmed the claim to legitimacy advanced 
by the “Organe central” subtitle discussed above. But the timing is curious: if an official 
statement were necessary, why was it not done for the first issue? The answer seems rooted in 
the immediate context: As the first issue published in exile and the first issue published after the 
demoralizing loss of Algiers, Issue Eight confronted the need to stake a more tenacious claim for 
El Moudjahid at a paradoxically more vulnerable time. It reasserted its right to speak for an 
organization whose survival seemed suddenly in jeopardy, even if doing so from abroad. 
At times, the close relationship between El Moudjahid and the FLN drew even closer – 
perhaps most noticeably when the paper served as the publisher for FLN statements. By 
publishing FLN declarations, El Moudjahid shifted from a journalistic approach that quoted 
previously published documents to serving as the Front’s mouthpiece. One of the clearest 
examples comes in Issue 66 (6/20/60), whose headline, printed in a font size larger than the 
 17 
journal’s title, read: “Appel à la nation”. Underneath was the text of a letter from Ferhat Abbas to 
the Algerian people. It was “signed” with his name and title, along with the location  - Tunis - 
and date – June 20, 1960. The date and location aligned with that of Issue 66 itself, suggesting 
the immediacy of El Moudjahid’s relation to the GPRA (El Moudjahid 1962, V. III, p. 121-3).xviii 
At moment like this, it could claim not only to speak for the FLN but also to speak as the FLN. 
Yet the relationship is asymmetrical: El Moudjahid might have been the official organ of the 
FLN, but the FLN did not speak solely through El Moudjahid. Hence in this particular case, the 
journal published Abbas’ letter and appended its own editorial, adding its voice to the FLN’s. 
7) Place of Publication 
The decision to include Abbas’ location reflected the broader set of choices that the FLN 
leadership had made regarding where to establish their headquarters, whether to disclose this 
publicly, and – if so – how to frame their choice of location. After the Battle of Algiers, the 
Algeria-based FLN leadership – the CCC – retreated into exile to regroup and reorganize. They 
were not the only FLN body in exile: what was termed the “exterior leadership” had been 
headquartered in Cairo since the beginning of the war. However, by 1957 the Cairo operations 
had become politically ineffective. Talks between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and French 
Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in March 1956 had resulted in a détente that reduced Nasser’s 
already lukewarm support of the FLN. According to Harbi (1980, p. 174), Nasser assured Pineau 
that arms deliveries to the ALN had been halted, while the Voice of Cairo broadcasts that to the 
Algerian population ceased.xix However, the revolution continued regardless of Nasser, whose 
ability to provide assistance was in any case severely curtailed after Egypt’s defeat in the 1956 
war.xx  
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Cairo may have seemed a less welcoming place by mid-1957, but it was also no longer 
the sole location available to the fleeing members of the CCE. The FLN had for some time been 
conducting military operations from Tunisia, taking advantage of its porous eastern border to 
transport men and arms into Algeria. Like Morocco, Tunisia had been granted independence 
from France in 1956. Although politically autonomous, their sovereignty in foreign policy 
concerns was not yet firmly established and was actively discouraged by France.xxi Yet both had 
provided tacit support since the early days of the war, partly in response to the FLN’s argument 
about Maghreb solidarity.xxii Relocating the CCE leadership – the GPRA – to Tunis, which 
remained its headquarters for the duration of the war, made this support public.  
As noted above, El Moudjahid also moved to Tunisia, although its new location was not 
immediately advertised. This was not surprising: the first issues of El Moudjahid had made no 
reference to the paper’s physical location, and the Tunis issues continued this practice. However, 
in June 1959 Issue 43 (6/8/59) introduced a new element to the front page: the address of El 
Moudjahid’s headquarters. The paper’s mailing address and telephone number in Tunis appeared 
in the upper right corner, along with the issue number, date, and price. The address and telephone 
number of a “Rabat office” were also listed. By making this information public, the paper 
relinquished one of the primary advantages of secrecy: greater freedom from French military 
retaliation. It also limited the Tunisian and Moroccan governments’ capacity to claim plausible 
deniability – that their aid to the FLN was limited to humanitarian support and refugee asylum, 
for example.  
Including contact information for El Moudjahid might be considered the result of a 
calculated risk taking, one elucidated by the tone of Issue 43’s headline: “Généreux parce que 
forts”.xxiii By mid-1959, the FLN’s sense of strength likely derived from several factors. These 
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included its success in bringing Algeria to the attention of the United Nations; growing evidence 
that the Algerian population supported independence; the increasingly public support of other 
governments, including Yugoslavia and several African states; and, perhaps most fundamentally, 
the ALN’s ability to remain an active fighting force, even as the French government continued 
increasing the number of soldiers stationed in Algeria - reaching 450,000 and beyond. The 
FLN’s position in world opinion was migrating from dismissal as a small, possibly fringe rebel 
group towards recognition as a national movement. By publishing the location of its offices, El 
Moudjahid claimed the status of an ordinary paper or party journal, which would have no need to 
hide its location. For the FLN and its push toward independence, strength, international 
recognition, and institutional normalcy went hand in hand. 
Yet El Moudjahid’s offices were not located in Algeria: normalcy was a goal, rather than 
a description of the status quo. Placing the Tunis and Rabat offices on El Moudjahid’s front page 
could also be seen as a statement about the extent of the Moroccan and Tunisian commitment to 
Algerian independence. That the GPRA had relocated to Tunis, with El Moudjahid and other 
supporting institutions in tow, was probably at most an open secret. Publicly “announcing” this 
reality via El Moudjahid and other means suggested that Tunisia and Morocco had established 
full sovereignty, meaning that they could assure no repeat of France’s 1958 bombing of the 
Tunisian town of Sakiet, which France had justified by pointing out the town’s FLN presence. It 
also presented Tunis and Rabat as willing to risk their relationship with France to publicly 
support the FLN, whether due to a vision of Maghreb solidarity or the desire to play a leadership 
role in the region, as well as a commitment to the Algerian cause. Plausible deniability was no 
longer necessary or appealing. 
8) Price 
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El Moudjahid’s addresses remained on the front page for two years. In June 1961, Issue 
82 (6/25/61) replaced them with a revised pricing system. Price was one of the journal’s most 
consistent front-page elements: it appeared – in various locations - on almost one of the ninety 
wartime issues.xxiv The insistence on assigning a price to every issue of El Moudjahid is in itself 
significant, for it links the journal to market relationships of supply and demand. By putting the 
journal on the market rather than distributing it gratis, the FLN could claim that an audience 
willing and eager to buy each issue existed – turning the market into a source of consumer 
“testimony” for popular support of the FLN. The price would likely not have deterred would-be 
readers: the amount charged was not prohibitive and varied little. From Issue 9 (8/20/57) through 
Issue 30 (10/10/58) the price remained a constant 30 francs, excluding only the unnumbered 
special issue of 9/19/58, which was priced at 20 francs. From Issue 31 (11/1/58) through Issue 91 
(3/19/62), the price remained a constant 40 francs (or 0.4 new francs), xxv excluding only the 
double issue 53/54 (11/1/59) and the issue that followed (11/16/59), both of which were priced at 
50 francs.  
While the constant pricing might suggest the stability of El Moudjahid’s ‘market 
demand’, the evolution in the national currency used suggests something more complex. It raises 
first and foremost the question of why an anti-French, revolutionary newspaper would choose to 
price itself in French currency at all. The answer – that no national Algerian currency yet existed 
– pointed both to the fact of continuing French dominance and the institutional immaturity of the 
GPRA. Although claiming the rights of a government in exile, El Moudjahid’s pricing 
highlighted the GPRA’s inability to take up most governmental functions, including the 
establishment of and control over a national currency. The GPRA’s vulnerability is highlighted 
by another instance of pricing instability: Issues 32 (11/20/58), 33 (12/8/58), and 39 (4/10/59) 
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listed the price in Tunisian millimes rather than (French) francs. While Issues 30-40 generally 
showed the price as “francs/millimes”, these three issues abandoned Algeria’s pricing altogether, 
suggesting perhaps that France’s ongoing efforts to prevent El Moudjahid’s distribution in 
Algeria had been successful, and that the paper was only available for sale in Tunisia. 
For the next two years, from spring 1959 through early summer 1961 - Issue 40 (4/24/59) 
through Issue 81 (6/4/61) - El Moudjahid’s price was given solely in francs. In late June 1961, 
the editors introduced a new pricing system with Issue 82 (6/25/61) – one that made a very 
different claim about El Moudjahid as a publication with a paying readership. The price was now 
given in the currencies of the three Maghreb countries: “Algeria – 0.40 new francs, Tunisia – 40 
millimes, Morocco – 0.40 dirham”. The new pricing list might be understood as part of a broader 
move to “normalize” El Moudjahid into one among many national newspapers with an 
international audience that might be sold at a newsstand, like Die Spiegel, Le Monde, or Al-
Hayat. It might also be seen as suggesting that the ‘market demand’ for the paper extended 
around the region, like support for the Algerian cause itself. Yet the denominations, if not the 
national currencies used, arguably highlight the GPRA’s continued provisionality, as well as the 
vulnerability of the nascent Moroccan and Tunisian states. All prices were iterations of “40” – 
indicating that independence brought a change in currency name, not in valuation. (Morocco 
appears to have even re-valued its dirham in keeping with France’s introduction of the “new” 
franc.) Furthermore, while the inclusion of countries beyond Algeria in this price list suggests El 
Moudjahid’s interest in a readership that extended beyond national boundaries, this interest 
appears limited to French North African territories. Although El Moudjahid throughout the war 
published headlines and articles invoking solidarities with Africa and the Middle East,xxvi the 
price list did not: it did not include France, most notably, but nor did it include Francophone 
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Africa, non-Francophone North African countries like Libya and Egypt, or any lands further 
East.xxvii 
9) Slogan and flag 
In contrast to the subtle argument about Maghreb solidarity made through the publication 
of El Moudjahid’s offices and price list, the slogan that appeared on the cover of most issues 
made an unambiguous claim of domestic support: “Révolution Par le Peuple et Pour le Peuple”. 
‘By the people and for the people’ was not a newly minted phrase - its most obvious connection 
was with Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address of 1863, which famously defined democratic 
governance as characterized by these elements. The global resonance of this phrase helped 
position the FLN as the embodiment of the nation’s popular will, fighting by popular demand 
and with popular support, while situating El Moudjahid as both witness and participant in this 
revolution.  (The slogan did disappear for a time from the cover. Absent from the 9/19/58 special 
issue, it reappeared in Issue 30 (10/10/58) but disappeared from Issues 31 (11/1/58) through 47 
(8/3/59).) After independence, it would be incorporated into the national constitution as the state 
motto.xxviii 
Images of the Algerian national flag made a similar if more visual declaration that the 
FLN and El Moudjahid represented the Algerian nation. The cover pages of El Moudjahid’s first 
three issues included hand-drawn illustrations of the flag, which consists of two panels – one 
green, one white – that bisect the flag vertically. A crescent and star, both red, sit in the centre of 
the flag, bridging the green and white panels. Claiming a national flag for Algeria was itself a 
revolutionary act: it visually articulated a national identity for Algeria and Algerians. The 
concept of an Algerian national identity – to outsiders, at least – was not self-evident: in French 
eyes, the “Algeria” invaded in 1830 was not a sovereign national state but a discrete jumble of 
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tribes, caravan routes, and empty territory. Hence one of the foremost arguments for 
independence hinged upon the articulation of a pre-colonial Algerian identity that was violated 
by each assertion that the Algerian identity could only be French. As a result, it could be argued 
that the revolutionary struggle for independence was legitimated by the degree to which it aimed 
for the restoration, rather than establishment, of national sovereignty. El Moudjahid’s task was 
thus to write this sovereign Algeria back into history, after so many years of French efforts to 
write it out. 
As a recognizable sign of national sovereignty, the national flag countered the French 
claim that Algeria was an integral part of France and that “Algerians” was - like “Bretons” - at 
most a regional identity, and one reserved for those with French citizenship rather than those of 
“indigène” status. Nor was the flag presented as a new creation. Although the precise history of 
the Algerian national flag is contested, it is often said to invoke the standard that Emir 
Abdelkader had used during his fight against the French army in the 1840s, or to reference the 
flag used by the Ottoman regency in Algiers. In both cases, the flags claimed as antecedents pre-
dated the French presence. They reinforced Algeria’s claim to be a nation by establishing the flag 
as a national symbol with a long-standing – and thus legitimizing –, pre-colonial history of its 
own.  
For the FLN, the inclusion of this flag in FLN-affiliated materials, like an August 1957 
tract that incorporated two hand-drawn flags into the ALN/FLN’s “signature” (Duchemin 1962, 
frontispiece), helped reinforce its claim to be the legitimate representative of the (legitimately 
existing) Algerian nation. El Moudjahid’s depiction of the flag worked in a similar manner.  
During the course of the war, its cover-page incorporations of the national flag evolved from 
sketches to photographs and headlines - barometers of the degree to which Algerian sovereignty 
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was itself evolving from the conceptual to the concrete. Cover page photographs showed an 
existing flag – not an envisioned one – and soon the journal presented it flying in concert with 
those of other independent states. Issue 48 (8/17/59), devoted to the conference of African states 
held that month in Monrovia, ran a photo showing the Algerian flag flying next to those of other 
participating states, with the headline: “le drapeau algérien a flotté à Monrovia”. (Participation in 
the African conference was particularly significant for the FLN because Algeria had been 
excluded from the Bandung conference: only independent states were invited.) The following 
year, El Moudjahid showed the flag flying – if unofficially – in its native land: Issue 74 
(12/15/60) featured a photograph of the Algerian flag held aloft by a woman in a public 
demonstration, accompanied by the headline “Le drapeau algérien flotte à Alger”. Finally, Issue 
83 (8.19.61) placed a photograph showing the Algerian flag flying high above a “mass 
demonstration” held in Casablanca in early July between the supra-headline, “Ni partage ni 
amputation”, and the headline, “L’Algérie souveraine”.xxix  
Establishing National Time 
The nine cover page elements outlined above contributed substantively to the overall 
narrative that El Moudjahid presented readers (both supportive and hostile). But they should not 
be isolated entirely from their broader context: these visual elements interlaced with the content 
of the page’s text. For those who read the paper or even glanced at the cover, the headline and 
article text (and accompanying photographs), which recounted or commented upon the latest 
developments, were likely its most striking feature. Together, these elements dramatized the 
struggle for independence in a series of discrete, punctuated moments that communicated a sense 
of urgency. What helped knit each issue into a larger whole was the inclusion of an issue number 
and publication date, which suggested a larger narrative about the coherence of the struggle and 
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the inevitability of the war’s progress. In doing so, El Moudjahid contributed to a broader 
project: the creation of a uni-directional national time. 
 El Moudjahid’s editors fore-grounded the passage of time in several ways that reinforced 
its centrality as a rhetorical trope and also as a marker of the flow of events. Articles and 
editorials demonstrated an acute sensitivity to Algeria’s appearance on the world stage, and 
displayed a historicized consideration of each event’s long-term import. This was most evident in 
the journal’s concerns that world opinion should recognize the importance of the Algerian issue 
and the role of the FLN and the Algerian people in changing history. It was also sensitive to the 
passage of time since the start of the war, to measuring the duration of the struggle, and 
(particularly in the early years) to highlighting the imminence of independence. In all cases, the 
concern with time included articles and editorials as well as the cover. 
In the paper’s early issues, the impact of time’s passage was often communicated through 
the use of book imagery. The metaphor of opening “un nouveau chapitre” was employed several 
times, including consecutive appearances in Issue 3 (9.56), where it served as the title of 
Ramdane’s editorial, and in Issue 4 (11.56), where it appeared in the introduction. In the 
editorial, the “chapter” was positioned as part of the “story” of the Algerian revolution; in the 
introduction, it referenced history more broadly. Yet while time captured in book-length might 
seem both epic and distant, El Moudjahid’s covers stressed that it was also an urgent, immediate 
matter. The immediacy of the future was repeatedly professed: the final hour of liberation 
appeared not only inevitable but also imminent. This stance was supported by the number of 
cover headlines that employed time markers, like “à l’heure” and “à l’ère”, and directional terms, 
of which “vers” was the most common.xxx Verbs played a lesser role in this process: although 
 26 
some headlines included present or future tense verbs, most headlines consisted solely of noun-
adjective phrases. 
With or without verbs, the book metaphors and time markers made clear that the passage of 
time was linear and uni-directional: launching the independence struggle initiated a trajectory of 
inevitable progress. The editorial of Issue 12 linked the book metaphor to a broader idea of 
national history, arguing that  
On November 1, 1954 the Algerian people made the irrevocable decision to change 
their destiny, to turn the most sombre and the most tragic page of their history and to 
embark upon the path of a new world, freed from oppression and obscurantism. This 
date does not mark merely a transition, a simple passage from one phase of history to 
another. It is the point of departure of a new life, a new History, a History of Algeria 
shaken from top to bottom and rebuilt on entirely new foundations. 
 
The editorial presented this choice to “turn the page” as irrevocable: once turned, the page could 
not be turned back (El Moudjahid 1962, V. I, p. 162). Moreover, this passage identified the 
struggle as not only marking a major moment in Algerian history, but also rather creating a new 
history – a History. The editorial presented the Toussaint attacks as the product of a national 
decision made by the entire Algerian community, rather than the risky gamble of a few men. 
Time here played a role not only as the measurement of the FLN’s progress toward 
independence, but more fundamentally as something changed by the independence struggle. Just 
as history was re-envisioned as History, time was re-imagined as national time, in which 
individuals interacted as Algerians engaged in a collective project of national liberation and 
nation building. 
This national time – that of the “new History of Algeria” – was populated with 
anniversaries, like those of the Soummam conference and the formation of the GPRA. The most 
important anniversary, of course, was that of the Toussaint attacks, which El Moudjahid’s 
headlines proclaimed each year: “La révolution à [deux, trois, quatre] ans”. In 1959, the journal 
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marked the five-year anniversary with a special double issue. Issue 53-54 (11/1/59) cost 50 
francs and included a small “Numéro Spécial 20 pages” violator in the bottom corner of its cover 
page. The cover featured a photograph of a copy of the FLN appeal issued to the Algerian people 
on November 1, 1954, marking the anniversary by highlighting FLN-popular relations rather 
than the attacks themselves. El Moudjahid employed the symbolic power of this date on other 
occasions as well, using November 1, 1954 rhetorically in numerous articles as an invocation of 
this national time. National time was the bridge that connected Algeria’s pre-colonial past to her 
post-colonial future, without denying the radical ruptures of the colonial present. As Duchemin 
(1962) also found, reclaiming Algeria’s past through the figures of men like Jugurtha and 
Abdelkader reframed it in the context of colonial resistance – a resistance that was finding its 
fullest realization in the current struggle. Consequently, November 1, 1954 became the 
foundational point from which Algeria’s progress as a nation could be measured, hence to which 
it must refer.  
Complicating Benedict Anderson’s arguments about time’s role in the national 
community, El Moudjahid presented Algeria’s national time as both horizontal and vertical – 
both temporal and sacral. Its emphasis on the revolution’s progress illustrated Anderson’s 
understanding of national time as the inert – though uni-directional – temporality through which 
a national community passes as it develops (Anderson 1991, p. 26). Hence, as noted above, El 
Moudjahid’s articles and headlines highlighted recent achievements - military victories, political 
developments - as measures of Algerian progress over time. Cover elements like issue number 
and date more subtly reinforced the sense of linear time. Each issue was numbered, and the issue 
number appeared in the upper corner of the cover. The publication date, which was given 
according to the Gregorian calendar, appeared next to it.xxxi Issue numbers and dates provided 
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linked El Moudjahid to standard serial publishing practices; but they also communicated an idea 
of open-ended linear temporality. The orderly sequence of numbers established a connection 
between issues, giving them a structural coherence, and further suggested that this coherence had 
value. Numbering reminded readers that each issue was part of a larger whole – the broader 
whole of El Moudjahid.  
It also reminded readers that time flowed in one direction. While there was a first issue, 
there was no suggestion of a final issue. Instead, El Moudjahid’s publication date anchored the 
reader in calendar time, reinforcing a sense of time as linear. Dating the issues reinforced their 
currency, but also highlighted their limited shelf lives. For the reader, El Moudjahid’s value was 
ephemeral: its information was meaningful only so long as it remained current. Although not a 
newspaper in the strict sense, it resembled Anderson’s national newspaper to the extent that it 
presented a development-oriented depiction of events unfolding in the “homogenous, empty 
time” in which the “secular, historically clocked, imagined community” imagines the nation 
(1991, p. 33-6). 
However, as an “organ” El Moudjahid’s mandate differed from that of Anderson’s 
national newspaper. Its pages highlighted developments related to the FLN and the struggle for 
independence, ignoring or giving less attention to stories a general-interest paper might consider 
newsworthy. The result was that newspaper linearity was balanced by verticality, which 
activated a kind of sacral time. The commemoration of anniversaries and the frequent references 
to November 1, 1954 described above also suggested a sacralization of the annual calendar. El 
Moudjahid published “date counts” in the upper corner of its cover page starting with Issue 8 
(8/5/57), the first issue published “in exile”. Its special issue of 9/19/58, which marked both the 
1,416th day of the revolution and the first day of the republic, reemphasized these originary 
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moments. The front-page date counts ceased six weeks later with the publication of Issue 31 on 
the Toussaint attacks’ four-year anniversary, leaving the project of re-sacralizing the nation to 
the articles and editorials inside.  
 
Assessing El Moudjahid 
This article has focused on El Moudjahid’s structure, asking: what do we learn from 
looking at the elements on its cover or front page, and analyzing their evolution over time? This 
analysis has produced five key insights. First, that the challenges of war-time publishing were 
sizeable and did meaningfully impact El Moudjahid, whether regarding the printing technology 
used or the politically sensitive decision to publish a physical address on the cover page. Second, 
that the efforts expended to keep El Moudjahid publishing despite the challenges signal the 
importance placed upon it and on communication in general during the struggle for 
independence – communication that included foreign observers and neighbour states as well as 
the Algerian people, the French government, and the French public. Third, that the specific 
elements on El Moudjahid’s cover / front page produced a coherent, relatively consistent 
message over time. Fourth, that this message engaged broadly with accepted international 
conventions through cover elements, including the paper’s use of a Western, Christian-origin 
calendar and numbered issues. Fifth, that these elements were deployed to support the crucial 
project of creating a national community, particularly the horizontal and vertical marking of 
time, the crescent and star emblem, the Algerian flag, and the “Révolution Par le Peuple et Pour 
le Peuple” slogan. 
Anderson’s work on nationalism helped unpack issues of language and time in print 
media’s role in constructing national communities, helping situate the arguments made in the 
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insights above. However, it was White’s concept of the ‘content of the form’ that provided the 
broad theoretical foundation for taking El Moudjahid seriously as an embodied physical object as 
well as a collection of articles and editorials. While scholars have quoted extensively from latter, 
using it as a primary-source archive when searching for evidence of Frantz Fanon’s contributions 
to El Moudjahid, or signs of FLN thinking at particular points in the struggle, they have put little 
analytic pressure on the cover and its constituent parts. Yet doing so opens up a deeper and more 
substantive understanding of the journal, its operations, and its impact, in ways that can only 
enrich its more archival uses in future scholarship. 
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1962 (Paris:  Presses de la Cité, 1994). 
xi In his biography of Ramdane, Khalfa Mameri identifies Allal Taalbi, Ahmed Boumendjel, 
Frantz Fanon, and Malek as part of the “pléiade de belles plumes” writing the French edition, 
with Abdallah and Abderrahman Cheriet and Mohamed El Mili involved in the Arabic. See 
Khalfa Mameri, Abane Ramdane: Héros de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 
1988), p. 288. 
xii The first two issues of El Moudjahid depicted the title in both its French transliteration and in 
Arabic script; subsequent cover pages showed the title only in French transliteration.  
xiii Eqbal Ahmad argues that the term was frequently applied to anti-colonialist activities in 
Muslim-majority colonies, including the primarily secular liberation struggles of the mid-
twentieth century. Although these movements were not principally religious in character, “jihad, 
noun, to struggle, from the Arabic root verb J.H.D., to strive, was nevertheless a favoured word 
among Muslims in their struggle of liberation from colonial rule.” See his “The Roots of 
Violence in Pakistani Society,” in Zia Mian and Iftikar Ahmad, editors, Making Enemies, 
Creating Conflict; Pakistan’s Crisis of State and Society (Lahore: Mashal, 1997). 
xiv “Algerian rebels accuse Tunisia of aiding French ‘colonialists’”, New York Times, 7.23.58. 
xv Whether this unmediated access to the CCE continued is difficult to determine. Ramdane’s 
biographer suggests that the close association between him and El Moudjahid made the journal a 
casualty of his deteriorating relations with Krim. Ramdane was increasingly excluded from 
critical decisions in the months prior to his assassination in December 1957; Mameri suggests 
that El Moudjahid may have been subject to the same quarantining. See Mameri, 288.  
xvi The exception is Issue 4 (11/56), a special issue that commemorated two years of the 
revolution and included the platform established at Soummam in August. The layout resembled a 
book cover: the typeface in which “El Moudjahid” was printed was dramatically different and 
“Éditions: Résistance Algérienne” was printed on the page in the area where the name of the 
publishing house would appear. 
xvii The addresses of El Moudjahid’s offices in Tunis and Rabat also appeared under the price 
after addresses were introduced in Issue 43 (6/8/59). 
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xviii Numerous other examples exist, as El Moudjahid published the declarations and 
communiqués of various FLN leadership groups (CRUA, CCE, CNRA, and GPRA) throughout 
the war years. 
xix Harbi had been a member of the MTLD before joining the FLN. For a more recent analysis, 
see Connelly, 102-104. 
xx Several scholars, including David Gordon, have argued that the French government distrusted 
Nasser’s assurances and continued to see Cairo as the “head” of the FLN. Irwin Wall has 
similarly linked France’s interception of the Athos, a Yugoslav ship carrying arms to the ALN 
apparently brokered with Egyptian assistance, to Pineau’s belief that Nasser had “taken him for a 
fool”. Although records indicate that after 1956 Egypt provided the FLN less aid than either 
Yugoslavia or Tunisia, the French appear to have continued to consider Nasser the primary 
supporter if not the mastermind of the FLN. See David C. Gordon, The Passing of French 
Algeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 55-6, and Irwin Wall, France, the United 
States, and the Algerian War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 36-7. Wall 
covers the war from an international relations perspective, focusing on the shifting relations 
between France, the United States, and Britain vis-à-vis Algeria and the Cold War. 
xxi France was particularly incensed by the decisions of the United States and Britain to deal with 
Tunisia and Morocco directly rather than through a French intermediary.  
xxii The FLN had been linking the fate of Algeria with that of Tunisia and Morocco since its first 
broadcast on the Voice of Cairo to announce the Toussaint attacks, in which the front demanded 
recognition of the “natural” Arab-Muslim unity of North Africa. The Soummam platform 
similarly argued that the independence of Tunisia and Morocco would be a sham unless Algeria 
was liberated as well. The FLN cited the Sakiet bombing as confirmation that France continued 
to regard Tunisia and Morocco as colonial dependencies. See “Vers la libération totale de 
l’Afrique du Nord”, Issue 18 (2/15/58) (El Moudjahid 1962, V. I, p. 315-17). 
xxiii The headline was accompanied by two photographs, each showing the ALN transferring a 
captured French soldier to the care of the Red Cross / Red Crescent. 
xxiv No price is listed for issues 2-8. 
xxv The French franc was re-valued in early 1960, with one “new” franc” equal to 100 “old” 
francs. 
xxvi See, for example, headlines like “Bagdad, Koweit, Beyrouth: Solidarité renforcée avec le 
people Algérien” (5/10/59); “… Un dèfi aux peoples Africains”, Issue 50 (9/14/59); or  “Algérie, 
Angola, Cuba: un meme combat”, Issue 80 (5/12/61). 
xxvii The frequent appeals to North African solidarity in the journal largely encouraged Morocco 
and Tunisia to view Algeria’s plight as the limiting factor curtailing their independence: If the 
“yoke” of colonialism remained on one nation, it remained on all. This solidarity should not be 
confused with a political pan-Maghrebianism that would fuse the people of all three countries 
into one nation-state. 
xxviii See Article 11, Chapter III: The State, in the Constitution of the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Algeria, available online through the Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United 
Nations, www.algeria-un.org. 
xxix Kassamen, the Algerian national anthem, was the other national symbol that El Moudjahid 
mobilized to actualize this national identity; like the flag, it represented one of the “must-have” 
components of modern nationhood. Although the national anthem did not appear on the cover, El 
Moudjahid’s references to the emotional experience of hearing or singing the national anthem 
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began with the first issue. Issue 1 featured a report of a recent battle, which described the 
“moving moment when our fighters [broke] into the national hymn, that which all Algerians – 
men, women, children and prisoners of colonialist jails and concentration camps – sing” (El 
Moudjahid 1962, V. I, p. 12).  
xxx See for example “L’ONU à l’heure de la médiation maghrèbine”, Issue 13 (12/1/57) and 
“Vers la liberation totale de l’Afrique du Nord”, Issue 18 (2/15/58),  
xxxi Placement of the issue number on the first four (undated) issues varies. The September 1958 
special issue (9/19/58) announcing the formation of the GPRA was not numbered. 
